Suchergebnisse

Covering the main themes of globalization, state power and culture from the fifteenth to the twenty-first century, this book explores the changing nature, meaning and significance of the Greater Mekong Sub-region.

The article explores different ways of thinking about Vietnamese politics through an examination of the writing of Adam Fforde and Edmund Malesky. It argues that in order to adjudicate between different approaches to analysing Vietnamese politics, we need to come to a view about what we think politics actually is (i.e., ontology forms the basis on which we can answer questions about epistemology). This is very different from more positivist approaches to political analysis which argue that deciding between competing arguments is about weighing the data. I argue, by contrast, that adjudicating between rival positions has more to do with a series of a priori positions or beliefs that influence what we consider reliable data in the first place.

This article explores the view that there is a tendency in Vietnam studies to overstate the degree to which there is a coherent central body, namely the state, directing the country. It is argued that is a myth which tends to surface and resurface over time. Having stated this as our point of departure, things get more complicated. Suggesting that such a myth is operating could mean many things. For instance, we might hesitate to say that there is no central body in Vietnam not least because the formal political apparatus seems well developed. So, is it a case of the central state simply being weaker than is sometimes thought or is there something else at stake, as yet unidentified? In addition, the article's title speaks of a centralised Socialist state. This raises the question of how and in what way the association of the Vietnamese state with Socialism might be relevant to an understanding of the myth. Finally, it is worth noting that asserting the existence of a myth of a centralised state in Vietnam might seem counter-intuitive. If there is one thing that any self-respecting student of Vietnam politics knows, it is that localism is very important: recall the proverb 'the emperor's writ stops at the village gate' (phep vua thua le lang) and the many studies which have explored the phenomena of localism in Vietnam. Thus, one might be forgiven for saying: 'what risk of overstating the authority of the central state here?'. What is clear, therefore, is that having stated an initial position, it is necessary to proceed carefully and to establish very precisely the nature of the alleged myth. This is what this article seeks to do.

In 2016, the Journal of Vietnamese Studies published a review by Adam Fforde of an edited book on Vietnamese politics by Jonathan London. It was quite a critical review. Fforde identified a number of weaknesses with the volume, as well as with individual contributions, including a tendency not to situate arguments within a wider literature; contradictory interpretation of empirics, assuming what needs to be demonstrated, and making assertions without evidence. Towards the end of the review, Fforde bemoaned the fact that the volume contributors were, in his words, allowed to go "their own way". He continued: "This is unfortunate. They should have been locked in a room and forced to argue it out. There is a need for a decent and likely very noisy argument about how best to analyse Vietnamese politics". Fforde's challenge is the stepping off point for this article.

Through a case study of Vietnam, the article explores the view that there is a tendency to overstate the degree to which there is a coherent central body, namely the state, directing the country. Exploring this myth, it argues that there is a tendency to reify the state, even in writing which is attentive to localism and the diversity of societal actors at play in Vietnamese political life. The article argues that the myth of the central state endures because there are domestic and foreign political interests that depend on it. However, more fundamentally, the myth endures because of the power of the state to colonise our minds such that even when the empirical data does not fit with the idea of the state, we make it fit. The article's findings have implications for the study of politics far beyond the Vietnamese case.

Through a case study of Vietnam, the article explores the view that there is a tendency to overstate the degree to which there is a coherent central body, namely the state, directing the country. Exploring this myth, it argues that there is a tendency to reify the state, even in writing which is attentive to localism and the diversity of societal actors at play in Vietnamese political life. The article argues that the myth of the central state endures because there are domestic and foreign political interests that depend on it. However, more fundamentally, the myth endures because of the power of the state to colonise our minds such that even when the empirical data does not fit with the idea of the state, we make it fit. The article's findings have implications for the study of politics far beyond the Vietnamese case. (JCSA/GIGA)

Abstract: Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos share a number of similarities: All three countries are former colonies of France located next to one another on the Southeast Asian mainland; all three witnessed the rise of communist parties to nationwide power in the mid-1970s; and all three have also seen fast-rising economic growth and falling poverty since the 1990s, and are viewed as undergoing a process of "reform" involving a shift from central planning to a market economy. Yet Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia remain bastions of illiberalism and one-party rule despite rapid economic growth and falling poverty. What will it take to reform their elitist political cultures and curtail the use of public office for private ends?

Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos share a number of similarities: All three countries are former colonies of France located next to one another on the Southeast Asian mainland; all three witnessed the rise of communist parties to nationwide power in the mid-1970s; and all three have also seen fast-rising economic growth and falling poverty since the 1990s, and are viewed as undergoing a process of 'reform' involving a shift from central planning to a market economy. Yet Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia remain bastions of illiberalism and one-party rule despite rapid economic growth and falling poverty. What will it take to reform their elitist political cultures and curtail the use of public office for private ends? Adapted from the source document.